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Abstract
In a recent paper I proposed a system for qualitative probabilistic reasoning, based
on argumentation, and proved its correctness with respect to probability theory. This
system was ﬂawed. In particular, it failed to take proper account of d-separation,
and so can give erroneous results in certain cases. This paper identiﬁes some of
the problems caused by this ﬂaw, examines their extent, and then ﬁxes the ﬂaw. While
the main thrust of the paper is to overcome this ﬂaw, the discussion of the prob-
lems caused by the ﬂaw exposes some general issues in qualitative probabilistic rea-
soning.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the last few years there have been a number of attempts to build sys-
tems for reasoning under uncertainty that are of a qualitative nature––that is
they use qualitative rather than numerical values, dealing with concepts such
as increases in belief and the relative magnitude of values. Between them,
these systems address the problem of reasoning in situations in which
knowledge is uncertain, but in which there is a limited amount of numerical
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information quantifying the degree of uncertainty. One class of these systems
are systems of abstraction. In systems of abstraction, the focus is mainly on
modelling how the probability of a hypothesis changes when evidence is
obtained and there is no need to commit to exact probability values. They
thus provide an abstract version of probability theory, known as qualitative
probabilistic networks (QPNs), which ignores the actual values of individual
probabilities but which is nevertheless suﬃcient for planning [18], explanation
[2] and prediction [11] tasks. Another class are systems of argumentation.
Systems of argumentation are based on the idea of constructing logical ar-
guments for and against formulae, establishing the overall validity of such
formulae by assessing the persuasiveness of the individual arguments. Sys-
tems of argumentation have been applied to problems such as diagnosis,
protocol management and risk assessment [5], as well as handling inconsis-
tent information [1], and providing a framework for default reasoning
[4,8,14].
In a recent paper [10] I described a hybridisation of the argumentation and
abstraction approaches by introducing a logical system for reasoning about
how probabilities change, called the qualitative probabilistic reasoner (QPR).
The input to this system is a set of logical formulae describing probabilistic
relationships between variables, and information about how the probabilities
of particular formulae change. In [10] I showed that the system can establish
exactly those changes in probability in other formulae that are sanctioned by
probability theory. However, there is a ﬂaw in QPR as originally deﬁned. The
main contribution of this paper is to identify the ﬂaw, discuss its consequences,
ﬁx it. Since the eﬀects of the ﬂaw hinge on the interaction between diﬀerent
kinds of qualitative probabilistic information, this paper also makes a more
general contribution to the study of qualitative probabilistic inference in
identifying this interaction.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next two sections, Sections 2
and 3 introduce a cut down version of QPR, termed QPRC, which is suﬃ-
cient to illustrate the ﬂaw. Section 4 then identiﬁes the ﬂaw QPR=QPRC
and elaborates on its consequences, before Section 5 shows how it may be
solved.
2. The logical language
The system introduced here is basically QPR from [10] without synergies,
and with no proof rules for evidential or intercausal reasoning. Thus QPRC is a
version of QPR which is only capable of reasoning in a causal direction (hence
the name).
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2.1. Basic concepts
We start with a set of atomic propositions L. We also have a set of con-
nectives f:;^;!g, and the following set of rules for building the well-formed
formulae (wﬀs) of the language.
1. If l 2L then l is a simple well-formed formula (swﬀ).
2. If l is an swﬀ, then :l is an swﬀ.
3. If l and m are swﬀs, then l ^ m is an swﬀ.
4. If l and m are swﬀs then l ! m is an implicational well-formed formula
(iwﬀ).
5. The set of all wﬀs is the union of the set of swﬀs and the set of iwﬀs.
There is an important point that should be noted about the connectives
which go to make up these formulae––that ! does not represent materialim-
plication. Instead it represents a constraint on the conditional probabilities
relating the formulae it connects. Such constraints have exactly the form of the
constraints embodied in the qualitative inﬂuences of QPNs, albeit for variables
with binary values, and their precise semantics is given below.
The set of all wﬀs that may be deﬁned using L, may then be used to build
up a database D where every item d 2 D is a triple ði : l : sÞ in which i is a
token uniquely identifying the database item (for convenience we will use the
letter i as an anonymous identiﬁer), l is a wﬀ, and s gives information about
the probability of l. In particular we take triples ði : l :"Þ to denote the fact
that PrðlÞ increases, and similar triples ði : l :#Þ, to denote the fact that PrðlÞ
decreases. Triples ði : l :$Þ, denote the fact that PrðlÞ is known to neither
increase nor decrease. It should be noted that the triple ði : l :"Þ indicates that
PrðlÞ either goes up, or does not change––this inclusive interpretation of the
notion of ‘‘increase’’ is taken from QPNs––and of course a similar proviso
applies to ði : l :#Þ. Since we want to reason about changes in belief which
equate to the usual logical notion of proof, we also consider increases in belief
to 1 and decreases in belief to 0, indicating these by the use of the symbols *
and +, and the values 1 and 0. The meaning of a triple ði : l :*Þ is that
the probability of l becomes 1 if it is not 1 already, ði : l :+Þ means that the
probability of l becomes 0 if it is not already. ði : l : 1Þ means that the
probability of l is 1 and ði : l : 0Þ means that the probability of l is 0. We also
have triples ði : l :lÞ which indicate that the change in PrðlÞ is unknown. In
addition, for reasons which will become clear later, we need a symbol to de-
note a probability whose value is not known (as distinct from a change in
probability whose value is not known). This symbol will be o, so the triple
ði : l : oÞ means that the value of PrðlÞ is unknown, but is known not to change.
While this profusion of symbols might seem baroque, it is unfortunately
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necessary in order to distinguish the diﬀerent aspects of qualitative probabi-
listic reasoning. 1
2.2. Non-material implication
As mentioned above, ! does not represent material implication but a con-
nection between the probabilities of antecedent and consequent. This is the key
to understanding the system. We take iwﬀs, which we will also call ‘‘implica-
tions’’, to denote that the antecedent of the iwﬀ has a probabilistic inﬂuence on
the consequent. Thus we are not concerned with the probability of the iwﬀ, but
what the wﬀ says about the probabilities of its antecedent and consequent. More
precisely we take the triple ði : a ! c : þÞ to denote the fact that:
Prðcja;X ÞP Prðcj:a;X Þ
for all X for which there is a triple ði : X ! c : sÞ (where s is any sign). The
eﬀect of the X in this inequality is to ensure that the restriction holds whatever
is known about formulae other than c and a––whatever the probabilities of a
and c, the constraint on the conditional probabilities holds. Similarly the triple
ði : a ! c : Þ denotes the fact that:
Prðcja;X Þ6 Prðcj:a;X Þ
again for all X for which there is a triple ði : X ! c : sÞ. It is possible to think of
an implication ði : a! c : þÞ as meaning that there is a constraint on the
probability distribution over the formulae c and a such that an increase in the
probability of a entails an increase in the probability of c, and an implication
ði : a ! c : Þ as meaning that there is a constraint on the probability distri-
bution over the formulae c and a such that an increase in the probability of a
entails a decrease in the probability of c. We do not make much use of triples
such as ði : c ! a : 0Þ 2 since they have no useful eﬀect but include them for
completeness––ði : c ! a : 0Þ indicates that:
1 Dealing with categorical inﬂuences is the root cause of this profusion of symbols (compare the
set of signs used here with those in [13] for example). Broadly speaking, the signs used in QPNs (",
#, l and$ in the notation used here) represent ﬁrst derivatives of probability values with respect to
evidence (a point expanded on at length in [11]). While the only implications we have are non-
categorical, we are only dealing with derivatives and these are the only values we need to consider.
Once we introduce catagorical inﬂuences, we also introduce 1 and 0, landmark values in the
terminology of qualitative reasoning [7], which are probabilities that have not been diﬀerentiated.
The remaining signs arise from a need to have a set of values that is closed under the operations
carried out on them during inference. Of course, there is some interconnection between the two sets
of values (which is not there in regular qualitative reasoning) since knowing that a probability is 1,
0 or o tells us that there it has a zero derivative, and so it has value $.
2 As a result we will not worry about the possibility of confusing ði : l ! m : 0Þ with ði : l : 0Þ
where l and m are swﬀs.
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Prðcja;X Þ ¼ Prðcj:a;X Þ
for all X for which there is a triple ði : X ! c : sÞ, and so denotes the fact that
PrðcÞ does not change when PrðaÞ changes. We also have implications such as
ði : a ! c : ?Þ which denotes the fact that the relationship between Prðcja;X Þ
and Prðcj:a;X Þ is not known, so that if the probability of a increases it is not
possible to say how the probability of c will change.
With this interpretation, implications correspond to qualitative inﬂuences in
QPNs. Just as in QPNs, we often take implications to be causally directed, by
which we mean that the antecedent is a cause of the consequent, and enforce
the condition that chains of these directed links do not form a cycle. Thus we
can consider every set of implications to have an associated QPN, where each
arc in the QPN maps to an implication.
This simple picture is complicated because we have categorical implications
which allow formulae to be proved true or false. In particular, an implication
ði : a ! c : þþÞ indicates that when a is known to be true, then so is c. Thus it
denotes a constraint on the probability distribution across a and c such that if
PrðaÞ becomes 1, then so does PrðcÞ. This requires that:
Prðcja;X Þ ¼ 1
for all X for which there is a triple ði : X ! c : sÞ [9]. Note that this type of
implication also conforms to the conditions for implications labelled with +
(and so may be considered as a more precise specialisation of an implication
labelled with a +), and that if Prðcj:a;X Þ ¼ 1 as well, then PrðcÞ is always
equal to PrðaÞ. Similarly, a probabilistic interpretation of an implication
ði : a ! c : Þ which denotes the fact that if a is true then c is false, requires
that:
Prðcja;X Þ ¼ 0
for all X for which there is a triple ði : X ! c : sÞ. The conditions imposed on
the conditional values by these implications suggest the existence of a further
pair of types of categorical implication which are symmetric to those already
introduced. We have an implication ði : a ! c : þÞ which denotes the con-
straint:
Prðcj:a;X Þ ¼ 1
for all X for which there is a triple ði : X ! c : sÞ, and an implication
ði : a ! c : þÞ which denotes the constraint:
Prðcj:a;X Þ ¼ 0
for all X for which there is a triple ði : X ! c : sÞ.
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As mentioned above, the full system QPR allows for the representation of
probabilistic synergies, in particular product synergies [2,19]. It is also possible
to include additive synergies [2,18] and utilities [13] into this kind of system.
3. The proof theory
For the language introduced in Section 2 to be useful we need to give a
mechanism for taking sentences in that language and using them to derive new
sentences. In particular we need to be able to take sentences describing changes
in probability in particular formulae and use these to establish changes in
probability in other formulae. This is done using the consequence relation ‘QP ,
part of which is deﬁned in Fig. 1. The deﬁnition is in terms of Gentzen-style
proof rules where the antecedents are written above the line and the consequent
is written below. The consequence relation operates on a database of the kind
of triples introduced in Section 2 and derives arguments about formulae from
them. The concept of an argument is formally deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. An argument for a well-formed formula p from a database D is a
triple ðp;G; sÞ such that D ‘QP ðp;G; sÞ
The sign s of the argument denotes something about the probability of p
while the grounds G identify the elements of the database used in the derivation
of p.
Fig. 1. The causal part of the consequence relation ‘QP .
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To see how the idea of an argument ﬁts in with the proof rules in Fig. 1,
consider the following example.
Example 1. We have a database which denotes the fact that the proposition
‘‘premise’’ has a probability which increases to 1, and that there is a relation
between the proposition premise and the proposition ‘‘conclusion’’ such that if
the probability of premise becomes 1, so does the probability of conclusion.
This database is denoted:
ðf 1 : premise :*Þ D1
ðr1 : premise ! conclusion : þþÞ
From the database, by application of Ax it is possible to establish two simple
arguments:
D1 ‘QP ðpremise; ff 1g;*Þ
denoting that on the basis of f 1 we can infer that the probability of premise
either increases to, or remains at, 1, and
D1 ‘QP ðpremise ! conclusion; fr1g;þþÞ
denoting that on the basis of r1 we can infer that there is a connection between
premise and conclusion such that if the probability of the former increases to
(or is) 1, then the probability of the latter increases to (or is) 1. Now, taking
these two and applying ! -E, it is possible to build the argument:
D1 ‘QP ðconclusion; fr1; f 1g;*Þ
since applying impelim to * and ++ yields * (as we will see in a little while). Thus
from the database it is possible to build an argument for the probability of
conclusion becoming (or being) 1.
In order to apply the proof rules to build arguments, it is necessary to supply
the functions used in Fig. 1 to combine signs. A full deﬁnition of QPRC thus
requires the functions conjelim, conjintro, neg, and impelim. However, since all are
given in [10], and only impelim is used in this paper, this is the only function
which will be given here.
The function impelim is used to establish the sign of formulae generated by
the rule of inference ! -E. This means that impelim is used to combine the
change in probability of a formula a, say, with the constraint that the proba-
bility of a imposes upon the probability of another formula c. Since this
constraint is expressed in exactly the same way as qualitative inﬂuences are in
QPNs, impelim performs the same function as  [18], and is merely an extension
of it.
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Deﬁnition 2. The function impelim:Sg 2 f1;*; ";$; #;+; 0; l; og  Sg0 2 fþþ;
þ;þ; 0;;þ;; ?g 7!Sg00 2 f1;*; ";$; #;+; 0; l; og is speciﬁed by Table 1.
It is worth noting that Table 1 not only deals with the combination of
changes in probability, such as ", with probabilistic constraints, but also gives
the results of combining constraints and actual values like 1 and 0. Most of the
time these combinations give a value of o, which denotes a probability that does
not change and whose unchanging value is unknown.
4. The unbearable incorrectness of inference
As introduced in [10], QPR had three distinct sets of proof rules. One set,
reproduced here, permitted reasoning in a causal direction, that is in the di-
rection of the implications. Another set permitted reasoning in an evidential
direction, that is in the opposite direction to the implications, and the third set
permitted reasoning with synergies capturing intercausal reasoning [19]. The
soundness and completeness proofs for QPR were given by considering ﬁrst
the causal rules, then the causal and evidential rules, and ﬁnally all three sets of
rules together. Here we examine the causal rules, because it is here that the ﬂaw
we are primarily interested in resides.
4.1. The ﬂaw and its consequences
Now, once we have applied the proof rules we ﬁnd we have several argu-
ments for a given proposition p. Thus we have an argument set for the propo-
sition:
Deﬁnition 3. The argument set ADp for a proposition p from a database D is the
set of all arguments for p which may be constructed from D:
Table 1
Implication elimination impelim
þþ þ þ 0  þ  ?
1 1 o o o o o 0 o
* * " " $ # # + l
" " " " $ # # # l
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
# # # # $ " l " l
+ # + # $ " * " l
0 o 0 o o o 1 o o
l l l l $ l l l l
o o o o o o o o o
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ADp ¼ fðp;Gi; SgiÞjD ‘QP ðp;Gi; SgiÞg
Each of these arguments has a sign that summarises how the probability of p
changes according to the information in that argument. Typically we are in-
terested in the eﬀect of the information in all the arguments. To establish this,
we introduce a flattening function ﬂat which combines arguments by mapping
from a set of arguments ADp to the supported formula p and some overall
change in probability:
flat : ADp 7! hp; vi
where v is the result of a suitable combination of the signs of the arguments.
Now, because the eﬀect of each implication is deﬁned to occur whatever other
arguments are formed (this is a result of the constraint imposed on the con-
ditional probabilities by the implications), all combinations are completely
local, and the structure of the arguments may be disregarded when ﬂattening.
As a result, v is simply calculated as:
v ¼a
i
Sgi
for all ðp;Gi; SgiÞ 2 ADp where  is an extended version of the qualitative ad-
dition function used by QPNs, deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4. The function  : Sg 2 f1;*; ";$; #;+; 0; l; og  Sg0 2 f1;*; ";$;
#;+; l; og 7!Sg00 2 f*; ";$; #;+; l; og is speciﬁed by Table 2. Blank spaces rep-
resent impossible combinations.
The blank spaces in Table 2 are an important feature which deserve some
explanation. They arise as the result of the combination of a * and a +––an
increase to a probability of 1 and a decrease to a probability of 0––or the
combination of * or + with 0 or 1 respectively. These are simply incompatible
Table 2
Flattening ﬂat
1 * " $ # + 0 l o
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
* 1 * * * * * *
" 1 * " " l + 0 l "
$ 1 * " $ # + 0 l $
# 1 * l # # + 0 l #
+ + + + + 0 + +
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
l 1 * l l l + 0 l l
o 1 * " $ # + 0 l o
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in the sense that it is not possible to deﬁne a probability distribution which will
allow this behaviour (something that is proved in Theorem 11 below).
With ﬂat and  established we can give the overall procedure for deter-
mining the change in probability of a formula p in which we are interested. This
is:
1. Add a triple ði : q : sÞ for every formula q whose change in probability is
known.
2. Build ADp using the C-rules.
3. Flatten this set to FlatcðADp Þ where Flatc ðADp Þ ¼ flatðADp Þ.
Flattening is described in this way to allow for diﬀerent ﬂattening mecha-
nisms to be used for diﬀerent kinds of reasoning while still using ﬂat (see [10]
for details).
We can now see how problems arise and establish what the ﬂaw in
QPR=QPRC is. This can be done through some examples. Consider the fol-
lowing:
Example 2. The following clauses represent the fact that a has a positive in-
ﬂuence on b, and b has a positive inﬂuence on c.
ðr1 : a ! b : þÞ D2
ðr2 : b ! c : þÞ
Now, consider we have evidence that a is suddenly observed to be true, so that
the triple ðf 1 : a :*Þ is added to the database, it is possible to build the fol-
lowing argument concerning PrðcÞ using QPRC:
D2 ‘QP ðc; ff 1; r1; r2g; "Þ
This is built by combining f 1 and r1 using ! -E, and then using the result of
this inference with r2 using ! -E again. This argument may then be ﬂattened
to give the pair hc; "i.
This is entirely correct as one would hope from such a simple example.
However, consider what happens in the following small variation on the
example:
Example 3. Here b is known to be true:
ðr1 : a ! b : þÞ D3
ðr2 : b ! c : þÞ
ðf 2 : b : 1Þ
Now, with the same additional information as before, we get two arguments
about PrðcÞ using QPRC:
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D3 ‘QP ðc; ff 1; r1; r2g; "Þ
D3 ‘QP ðc; ff 2; r2g; oÞ
and again the two arguments may then be ﬂattened to give the pair hc; "i.
This second example is not entirely correct in that it does not make as
precise a prediction as is possible using probability theory.
The problem is this. QPRC predicts that the probability of c will either
increase or remain the same––this is the inclusive reading of " that is standard
in the QPN literature and which stems from the inequality in the denotation of
the ‘‘!’’ symbol. However, since b is known to be true, any subsequent
probabilistic propagation from a to c is blocked. In the terminology of
Bayesian networks, c is d-separated [6, pp. 7–14] from a. As a result, proba-
bility theory tells us that irrespective of changes in the probability of a, the
probability of c will not change, and this is not respected in QPRC. QPRC
allows for the fact that the probability of c may not increase, since it hedges its
bets somewhat with the prediction of ", and so makes a sound prediction.
However, there is deﬁnitely a ﬂaw here that results from QPRC not handling
d-separation in causal reasoning.
In fact, the situation is worse than this ﬁrst analysis suggests. It is possible
for QPRC to actually give incorrect results. Consider this variation on the last
example.
Example 4. Here b is known to be true:
ðr1 : a ! b : þþÞ D4
ðr2 : b ! c : þþÞ
ðr3 : a ! d : þÞ
ðr3 : d ! c : Þ
ðf 2 : b : 1Þ
Now, with the additional information that ðf 1 : a :*Þ, we get three arguments
about PrðcÞ using QPRC:
D4 ‘QP ðc; ff 1; r1; r2g;*Þ
D4 ‘QP ðc; ff 2; r2g; oÞ
D4 ‘QP ðc; ff 1; r3; r4g; #Þ
and again the two arguments may then be ﬂattened to give the pair hc;*i,
whereas the correct answer, were d-separation taken into account, would be
hc; #i.
This is the error alluded to in the title of this section.
Now, this particular error can only occur if the chain of inferences that
should be blocked by d-separation is all categorical (otherwise the worst that
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could happen is the ﬁrst argument has sign " and ﬂattening produces l rather
than #, which is imprecise but not wrong), and if there is ‘‘old evidence’’ (evi-
dence that is already in the system) in order to generate a need for d-separation
to be taken into account in the ﬁrst place. Since all systems that stem from
QPNs are basically intended to only cope with single pieces of evidence (cer-
tainly that seems to be the case for Wellmans original formulation [18])
whenever we deal with more than one piece of evidence we are pushing the
limits of what is possible [16]. As a result, this error is not surprising. However,
it is worth ﬁxing it.
4.2. The extent of the problems
Before attempting to ﬁx the ﬂaw, it is worth examining the extent of its
consequences––identifying when it causes incorrect inferences to be drawn. In
the ﬁrst example above, we can see the existence of such an incorrect inference,
but can we obtain some results that formally circumscribe this kind of prob-
lem?
Following [11], it is possible to deﬁne the following concepts which allow us
to get an idea of the extent of the problem.
Deﬁnition 5. If applying ‘QP to a database D generates an argument ðp;G;pÞ,
then p is a prediction about the change in probability of p.
Now, as we have seen in Section 2, there is a whole menagerie of diﬀerent
predictions, replicated in Table 3. The top set of predictions are essentially
predictions that the probability of the given proposition will not change. The
next set of values are predictions that either there will be a change in one di-
rection, increase or decrease, or no change. The ﬁnal value is a prediction that
there will be an increase, decrease, or no change––it is less a prediction than
an admission that it is impossible to tell how the value will change.
Table 3
The full set of predictions possible in QPRC
1 Probability of 1
0 Probability of 0
o Unknown probability, value known not to change
$ No change in probability
* Probability increases to, or remains at, 1
+ Probability increases to, or remains at, 0
" Increase in probability, or no change
# Decrease in probability, or no change
l Increase, decrease, or no change in probability
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Now, the important point here is that the higher values in the table make
more precise predictions about changes, in the sense that knowing the value
will not change is more precise than knowing that it might increase (will either
increase or not change). Thus there is an order over the possible predictions in
terms of their precision:
Deﬁnition 6. The set of predictions P0 ¼ f1; 0; o;$g is the set of no change
predictions, the set P1 ¼ f*;+; "; #g is the set of change predictions, and
P2 ¼ flg is the set of vacuous predictions.
Deﬁnition 7.Given two predictions p and p0, from setsPi andPj respectively, p
is more precise than p0 if i < j, p is less precise than p0 if i > j, and p is as precise
as p0 if i ¼ j.
Since the set of predictions in P1 play a crucial role in what is to follow, it is
worth explaining exactly why they have this degree of precision. Essentially it is
because the form of qualitative probabilistic inference on which QPR=QPRC
is based is relativistic––it computes changes without taking account of the pre-
vious value. Thus when we obtain a prediction of * it is given with no guarantee
that the probability, before whatever change led to this prediction, was not
already 1. So it is not possible to guarantee that a change will actually occur.
Something similar is true of ", though here, even if the initial value was known,
there would still be imprecision in the prediction because of the P (or6) in the
deﬁnition of the probabilistic constraints which give rise to such predictions. 3
In addition to deﬁning the relative precision of two predictions, we can
deﬁne what it means if they agree. Intuitively, two predictions agree if they
predict changes that can be reconciled. Thus if one prediction is that the
probability of p is 0, and another prediction is that the probability of p will
increase to, or remain at, 1, then the two disagree. Alternatively, a prediction of
" and another of * agree since both predict changes in the same direction and
the latter is just more precise about the state that results from the prediction.
To formally deﬁne what agreement is, we need to distinguish between pre-
dictions of increases and predictions of decreases:
Deﬁnition 8. The set of change predictions P1 is the union of P
"
1 ¼ f*; "g, the
increasing predictions, and P#1 ¼ f+; #g, the decreasing predictions.
Note that P"1 \P#1 ¼ ;. We also have:
3 Although it is possible to deﬁne systems which do give precise predictions about changes
in value, systems that produce precise predictions are more awkward to work with than those that
do not [11].
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Deﬁnition 9. The set of categorical predictionsPcat is the union ofPcat0 ¼ f1; 0g,
the categorical value predictions, and Pcat1 ¼ f*;+g, the categorical change
predictions.
We call the categorical value predictions the limit predictions, and thus 1 is
known as the upper limit prediction, and 0 as the lower limit prediction.
Deﬁnition 10. The set of non-categorical predictions Pnon-cat is the union of
Pnon-cat0 ¼ fog, the non-categorial value prediction, Pnon-cat1 ¼ f"; #g, the non-
categorial change predictions, and the set of vacuous predictions P2 ¼ flg.
Note that Pcat \Pnon-cat ¼ ;.
At this point we should recall the discussion about the ﬂattening function
following Deﬁnition 4. The existence of the blank spaces in Table 2 can be
explained in terms of the following theorem which shows that it is not possible
to have categorical predictions for a proposition which conﬂict:
Theorem 11. It is impossible to have:
1. an increasing and decreasing categorical prediction; or
2. an increasing categorical prediction and a lower limit prediction; or
3. a decreasing categorical prediction and an upper limit prediction; or
4. an upper and lower limit prediction
for the same proposition.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume we have two arguments for p,
one with an increasing categorical prediction and one with a decreasing cate-
gorical prediction. For this to be the case, there must be one of the following
pairs of categorical implications (since only categorial implications can generate
categorical predictions): hði : q ! p : þþÞ; ðj : r ! p : Þi, hði : q ! p : þþÞ;
ði : r ! p : þÞi, hði : q ! p : Þ; ði : r ! p : þÞi, hði : q ! p : þÞ;ði : r !
p : þÞi, or symmetrical variations. Now, consider the constraints on the joint
probability distribution over p, q and r imposed by the ﬁrst pair. By deﬁni-
tion, these imply that Prðpjq;X Þ ¼ 1 and Prðpjr; Y Þ ¼ 0 for all X and Y , which
would require Prðpjq; rÞ to be both 1 and 0. Thus the ﬁrst pair of implications
cannot occur together. Similarly the constraints embodied by the second pair
would require Prðpjq;:rÞ to be 1 and 0, the third pair would also require
Prðpjq;:rÞ to be 1 and 0 and the fourth pair would require Prðpj:q;:rÞ to be 1
and 0. Since these are impossible, increasing and decreasing categorical pre-
dictions cannot occur together. The remaining parts of the result are proved
similarly. 
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This theorem gives us our ﬁrst taste of dealing with several predictions for
the same formula. Since a single prediction is related to a single argument, and
we typically have several arguments for a given formula, we often need to deal
with several predictions at a time. In fact, given some proposition p, what we
are interested in is the overall prediction after ﬂattening all the arguments in
the argument set for p. Thus we have:
Deﬁnition 12. The overall prediction of the argument set ADp is pO where
flatðADp Þ ¼ hp; pOi.
If all the arguments in an argument set ADp make non-categorical predictions,
then the argument set is said to be non-categorical. Otherwise it is said to be
categorical. The reason for this distinction is because of the nature of the
overall predictions made by these sets:
Theorem 13. The overall prediction of an argument set ADp is non-categorical if
and only if ADp is non-categorical. The overall prediction of an argument set A
D
p is
categorical if and only if ADp is categorical.
Proof. The ‘‘if’’ part of the theorem is as follows. If ADp is non-categorical, then,
by deﬁnition, all predictions made by arguments in ADp are non-categorical.
From the deﬁnition of , ﬂattening these predictions will give a non-categor-
ical prediction. Conversely, if ADp is categorical then there is at least one ar-
gument in ADp which makes a categorical prediction. From Theorem 11 we
know that we cannot have conﬂicting categorical predictions for any propo-
sition, and from the deﬁnition of  we know that combining a categorical and
non-categorical prediction will give a categorical prediction. Thus, it follows
that from the deﬁnition of , ﬂattening a mixed set of categorical and non-
categorical predictions will give a categorical prediction.
The ‘‘only if’’ part is as follows. If the overall prediction is non-categorical
then, from the deﬁnition of , the argument set cannot contain any categorical
predictions. Thus the argument set is non-categorical. If the overall prediction
is categorical then, again from the deﬁnition of , there must be at least one
categorical prediction in the argument set and so the argument set is cate-
gorical. 
There are a couple of important corollaries of this result:
Corollary 14. Adding a categorical argument to a non-categorical argument set
gives a categorical argument set.
Corollary 15. Adding a non-categorical argument to a categorical argument set
gives a categorical argument set.
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Now, the intuitive notion of agreement between predictions introduced
above is partly based on precision. A no change prediction agrees with an
increasing prediction (since an increasing prediction is a prediction of ‘‘either
an increase, or no change’’) or a decreasing prediction, and for similar reasons,
an increasing or decreasing prediction will agree with a vacuous prediction.
In fact, any two-non-categorical predictions will agree, since it is always
possible to ﬁnd some probability, or change in probability, that reconciles the
two predictions. Even predictions of " and # can be reconciled if the actual
change being predicted is 0. Thus at least one of two predictions that disagree
has to be categorical, and a little thought shows that the particular categorical
values of such predictions that cannot be reconciled are those which Theorem
11 rules impossible. In addition an non-categorical increasing prediction will
disagree with a categorical decrease (but not a lower limit prediction since the
probability might start at 0 and not change). A non-catgeorical decreasing
prediction will similarly disagree with a categorical increase, but not an upper
limit.
Thus we have:
Deﬁnition 16. Two predictions p and p0 disagree iﬀ:
1. one is an increasing prediction and the other is a decreasing categorical pre-
diction; or
2. one is an decreasing prediction and the other is a increasing categorical pre-
diction; or
3. one is an increasing categorical prediction and the other is a lower limit pre-
diction; or
4. one is a decreasing categorical prediction and the other is an upper limit pre-
diction; or
5. one is an upper limit prediction and the other is a lower limit prediction.
Two predictions are said to agree if they do not disagree.
This makes the idea of disagreement rather weak, but it is the only sensible
notion––given the tentative notion of an increase that we are dealing with, this
notion of disagreement is the only one that can be related to unsoundness with
respect to probability theory. That is, if two predictions disagree according to
Deﬁnition 16 and one is sound with respect to probability theory, then the
other is incorrect.
Now, the reason for this long digression from the solution of the problem
of not dealing with d-separation, is to be able to prove the following results:
Lemma 17. Given two non-categorical argument sets ADp and A
D0
p about a prop-
osition p, with overall predictions pO and p0O, such that A
D
p  AD
0
p , p
0
O will agree
with pO.
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Proof. The only time that pO and p0O can disagree is if one is increasing and the
other is decreasing. Consider pO to be increasing. Adding additional non-cat-
egorical predictions to pO using  will give an overall prediction which is either
increasing or vacuous. Thus the new overall prediction will not disagree with
pO, though it may be less precise. If pO is decreasing, the same argument can be
applied. Thus the two predictions cannot disagree, and the result follows. 
When argument sets are non-categorical, the predictions of individual ar-
guments are closely related to the signs propagated along trails in a QPN [2],
and the overall prediction of the argument set ADp which contains all the ar-
guments for p which can be built from a database is closely related to the sign
which is produced by the sign-propagation algorithm for QPNs [3]. As a re-
sult, Lemma 17 can be taken as a form of robustness result for inference in
QPNs.
It is worth noting that although it might be tempting to read it that way,
Lemma 17 does not mean that qualitative probabilistic inference is somehow
immune to unsoundness (and therefore inherently uninteresting). What the
lemma says is that provided there is at least one non-categorical prediction
which agrees with probability theory, adding in further non-categorical pre-
dictions will not make the overall prediction disagree with the original. (All
that will happen is that as both increasing and decreasing predictions are
added the overall prediction will become vacuous.) This behaviour is therefore
a reﬂection of the robustness of the ﬂattening procedure more than anything
else.
We can also consider the case where we have categorical arguments:
Lemma 18. Given two categorical argument sets ADp and A
D0
p about a proposition
p, with overall predictions pO and p0O, such that A
D
p  AD
0
p , p
0
O will agree with pO.
Proof. From Theorem 13 both pO and p0O will be categorical, and from The-
orem 11 they cannot disagree, so they must agree. 
In addition to these two cases, there is one in which the ﬁrst argument set is
non-categorical and the second is categorical:
Lemma 19. Given a non-categorical argument set ADp and a categorical argument
set AD
0
p about a proposition p, with overall predictions pO and p
0
O, such that
ADp  AD
0
p , p
0
O may disagree with pO.
Proof. Here all we need to show is that it is possible for pO and p0O to disagree,
and we can do that by example. From Theorem 13 pO will be non-categorical
while by Corollary 14 p0O will be categorical. Consider that pO is increasing and
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p0O is decreasing (because p
0
O is the result of adding an argument with sign + to
ADp ), then p
0
O will disagree with pO. If the argument that is added has sign *,
then the two predictions will agree. 
The ﬁnal case that one might imagine, where ADp is categorical and A
D0
p is non-
categorical, is ruled out by Corollary 15 since adding arguments to a categorical
argument set will give a categorical argument set. Taking all these results together,
we can conclude that adding a non-categorical argument to an argument set will
never cause the new overall prediction to disagree with the old overall prediction.
Now we can ﬁnally identify when, in general, the predictions of two argu-
ment sets can disagree, thus homing in on when the problem with causal in-
ference in QPR=QPRC, as currently deﬁned, will be signiﬁcant. This is when a
categorical argument is added to an argument set.
Theorem 20. Given two argument sets ADp and A
D0
p about a proposition p, with
overall predictions pO and p0O, such that A
D
p  AD
0
p , p
0
O will only disagree with pO
when:
1. ADp is non-categorical and A
D0
p is categorical; and
2. either pO is increasing and and p0O is decreasing or a lower limit, or pO is
decreasing and p0O is increasing or an upper limit.
Proof. For the ﬁrst part, consider AD
0
p to be formed by adding arguments to A
D
p .
Since, by Corollary 15, adding arguments to a categorical argument set will
give a categorical argument set, there are only three possibilities for the two
sets: (i) they are both categorical, in which case by Lemma 18 it is the case that
pO and p0O agree; (ii) they are both non-categorical, in which case by Lemma 17
it is the case that pO and p0O agree, or (iii) A
D0
p is non-categorical and A
D0
p is
categorical when, by Lemma 19 and the proof thereof, it is the case that pO and
p0O will disagree if one is increasing and the other is decreasing. The second part
follows directly from the deﬁnition of disagreement. 
This result concerns general argument sets. The speciﬁc case that we are
interested in is when the extra arguments in AD
0
p , over and above those in A
D
p ,
should be ruled out by d-separation. In Section 5 we formally deﬁne arguments
that should be ruled out by d-separation and denote them as invalid. Borrowing
that terminology without proper deﬁnition for now, we can state the case we
are interested in, that for which there is a problem, as being that in which when
ADp contains all the valid arguments for p (all those that are not invalid), and
AD
0
p contains all the valid arguments and some invalid ones as well.
In such a case we can see from Theorem 20 that the problem will arise only
when the invalid arguments added to ADp include at least one categorical
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argument and where either the overall prediction of ADp is increasing and the
overall prediction of AD
0
p is decreasing or lower limit, or the overall prediction
of ADp is decreasing and the overall prediction of A
D0
p is increasing or upper limit.
Since by Lemmas 17–19 only adding a categorical prediction can cause dis-
agreement, the problem arises when one of the invalid arguments is categorical
and in the opposite direction to the overall prediction of the valid ones.
There are two things that should be noted about this last result. First, the ﬂaw
we have been discussing in this paper is a consequence of categorical informa-
tion. It cannot, therefore, occur in QPNs and other systems which just deal with
non-categorical changes in value. In such systems we cannot have two predic-
tions disagreeing. Second, since categorical predictions are rather rare (since they
require every implication chained together as part of the associated argument to
be not only categorical but also categorical in the right direction) 4 it seems
unlikely that ignoring d-separation will cause major problems. However, the
problem does need to be ﬁxed, and this is the subject of the next section.
5. Correct causal inference
The discussion so far has identiﬁed where the ﬂaw in QPR=QPRC lies. It
occurs because additional arguments, over and above those which should be
ﬂattened, are combined in the ﬂattening process––ones that should be excluded
by d-separation––and these overturn the prediction that should be made.
5.1. Bringing in d-separation
How should we take d-separation into account when ﬂattening causal ar-
guments? 5 One way is to use the same technique that QPR, as described in
[10], used when dealing with combined causal and evidential reasoning and
combined causal, evidential and intercausal reasoning. This technique needs
the following deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 21. In the triple ði : l : sÞ, thewff l is said to be indexed by the symbol i.
Deﬁnition 22. A source of an argument ðp;G; sÞ is an swff indexed by an ele-
ment of G.
4 Bearing in mind that combining some categorical implications with some categorical
predictions does not yield a categorical prediction (see Table 1).
5 One might argue that a better solution is to take account of d-separation when constructing
arguments, but since identifying some forms of d-separation requires all arguments to be
constructed, as is clear from the deﬁnition of d-separation given below, it seems conceptually
simpler to simply build all arguments and rule out the ones which do not take account of d-
separation.
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Thus a source of an argument is one of the simple formula which ground it,
and form the head of a chain of implications.
Deﬁnition 23. The destination of an argument ðp;G; sÞ is p.
Thus the destination of an argument is the formula being argued for.
Deﬁnition 24. A well-formed formula p is said to be a cause of a well-formed
formula q if and only if it is possible to identify an ordered set of
iwffs fa1 ! c1; . . . ; an ! cng such that q is one of the conjuncts that make up
cn or includes one or more of the conjuncts that make up cn, one or more of the
conjuncts in every ai is also in ci1, and p is one of the conjuncts that make up
a1 or includes one or more of the conjuncts in a1.
In other words p is a cause of q if it is possible to build up a trail of (causally
directed) implications which link p to q.
Deﬁnition 25. A well-formed formula p is said to be an eﬀect of a well-formed
formula q if and only if it is possible to identify an ordered set of
iwffs fa1 ! c1; . . . ; an ! cng such that q is one of the conjuncts that make up
a1 or includes one or more of the conjuncts that make up a1, one or more of the
conjuncts in every ci is also in aiþ1, and p is one of the conjuncts that make up
cn or includes one of the conjuncts in cn.
Thus p is an eﬀect of q if it is possible to build up a trail of (causally directed)
implications that link q to p.
Deﬁnition 26. Two formulae p and q are d-separated if p or q has probability 1
or 0, or if for all arguments which have p as a source and q as their destination,
there is another formula r such that either:
1. p is a cause of r, r is a cause of q, and the probability of r is 1 or 0; or
2. r is a cause of p, r is a cause of q and the probability of r is 1 or 0; or
3. p and q are both causes of r and there is no argument ðr;G0; s0Þ such that all
the swffs indexed by elements of G0 are eﬀects of r, and the probability of r is
not 1 or 0.
The ﬁrst item deﬁnes the form of d-separation missing from QPRC. The
second item is required in evidential reasoning, and the third is required in
intercausal reasoning. Despite the fact that we are only concerned with causal
reasoning in QPRC, we include all these forms of d-separation in order to have
a deﬁnition that will work in every situation. An invalid argument is now one
that is built without taking account of d-separation:
Deﬁnition 27. An argument A ¼ ðp;G; sÞ is invalid if any source of A is d-
separated from p.
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This notion of invalidity diﬀers from that introduced in [10] only because the
notion of d-separation which underpins invalidity has been expanded. Thus
this new notion of invalidity rules out more arguments from ﬂattening and
hence from having an eﬀect on the overall prediction of an argument set.
Now, we have:
Deﬁnition 28. An argument A ¼ ðp;G; sÞ is valid if it is not invalid.
Now that we can identify which arguments are valid, and hence can be
helpfully ﬂattened, all that is necessary is to redeﬁne the procedure for deter-
mining the change in probability of some formula p. The new procedure is:
1. Add a triple ði : q : sÞ for every formula q whose change in probability is
known.
2. Build ADp using the C-rules.
3. Flatten this set to Flat0cðADp Þ where Flat0cðADp Þ ¼ flatðflatcðADp ÞÞ.
where:
flatc : A 7!fA 2 AjA is validg
With this change to the ﬂattening function, QPR=QPRC will not generate
spurious results by ignoring d-separation and so will be sound.
5.2. Back to QPR
What we have found, therefore, is that in order to correct the inference
carried out in QPRC, we have to check arguments before ﬂattening, and only
ﬂatten those arguments which are valid in the sense deﬁned above. These are
arguments which have been built using the set of C-rules and are not ruled out
by d-separation. The question we are interested in here is how, then, can we take
this result and use it to modify the original system QPR in order to make that
correct as well. To do this we need to recall how the original system was deﬁned.
As discussed above, QPR was deﬁned in much the same way as QPRC is
here, but rather than having just one set of proof rules it has three. QPR has
the same set of C-rules as were presented here plus a set of E-rules which permit
evidential reasoning, and a set of I-rules which permit intercausal reasoning.
Separate proof procedures were given for reasoning with the C-rules alone (it is
this ‘‘mode of inference’’ of the overall system 6 we have been discussing here),
with the C-rules and the E-rules, and with the C-rules, E-rules and I-rules. As
6 The scare quotes are used since these diﬀerent forms of inference were really an artifact of the
fact that I chose to construct the soundness and completeness proofs incrementally rather than
because I expected QPR to be used in three distinct ways.
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initially deﬁned, the procedure for using the C-rules was just that given earlier
in the paper––build arguments and then ﬂatten them with ﬂat; the procedure
for the C-rules and E-rules in combination was to build arguments, rule out
those made ineligible by d-separation or by using the same implication more
than once (which rules out cyclic arguments) and ﬂatten those; when using all
three sets of proof rules in conjunction we use the same procedure as for the
C-rules and E-rules.
With this description and the discussion in Section 5.1, it is clear how to patch
QPR. When just using the C-rules, we apply ﬂatc to the set of valid arguments;
when using the C-rules and E-rules we remove invalid arguments and non-
minimal arguments (the name given in [10] for cyclic arguments), and we adopt
the same procedure when using all three sets of rules. This neatly glosses over
another problem with [10], which is that the deﬁnition of d-separation given
there is itself ﬂawed––it is missing some of the conditions in Deﬁnition 24––
which would lead to the same kind of problems when using the C-rules and E-
rules together as we have investigated here for the C-rules. Of course, using the
revised version of QPR described here will correct both problems. This revised
version of QPR is described in full in [12], a modiﬁed version of [10].
5.3. The issue of many pieces of evidence
One interesting fact follows from the new ﬂattening function. In [10] it was
claimed that when used for causal reasoning, the construction of arguments
was entirely local, that is once an argument was built, the change it predicted
could not be ruled out by further inference. Clearly this is not true of the re-
vised version of QPR since ﬂattening will now rule out arguments whose
sources are d-separated from their destinations. Now, to some extent this lack
of locality is an implementation issue. After all, in our example it is possible to
identify that a and c are d-separated while the argument is being constructed.
However, the issue is more complex––consider what would happen in D2 or D3
if instead of knowing that b was true, we knew that d was true when we also
had ði : d ! b : þþÞ in our database. In that case the probability of b would
still be 1, but in order to know this, it would ﬁrst be necessary to construct all
arguments for b and ﬂatten them. Thus the order in which arguments are
constructed becomes important, and that opens up a whole new set of issues.
To illustrate these issues, consider the following example:
Example 5. The following clauses represent the fact that a has a positive inﬂuence
on b, and b has a positive inﬂuence on c while d has a negative inﬂuence on b.
ðr1 : a ! b : þÞ D5
ðr2 : b ! c : þÞ
ðr3 : d ! b : Þ
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Now, consider we have evidence that PrðaÞ and PrðdÞ are observed to be
true, so that the triples ðf 1 : a :*Þ and ðf 2 : d :*Þ are added to the database,
it is possible to build two arguments concerning PrðcÞ using QPRC:
D5 ‘QP ðc; ff 1; r1; r2g; "Þ
D5 ‘QP ðc; ff 2; r3; r2g; #Þ
The ﬁrst is built by combining f 1 and r1 using ! -E, and then using the result
of this inference with r2 using! -E again. The second is built by combining f 1
and r2 using ! -E and then chaining the result of this with r3 using ! -E
again. These two arguments may then be ﬂattened to give the pair hc; li.
This is entirely correct. Because we have no information about the strength
of the inﬂuences, there is no way to resolve the tradeoﬀ between the positive
inﬂuence on a on c and the negative inﬂuence on d on c (though see [9,15,17]
for approaches to resolving such tradeoﬀs). Now consider a small variation on
this new example.
Example 6. Here d has a categorical inﬂuence on b:
ðr1 : a ! b : þÞ D6
ðr2 : b ! c : þÞ
ðr3 : d ! b : Þ
Again consider we have evidence that PrðaÞ and PrðdÞ are observed to be true,
so that the triples ðf 1 : a :*Þ and ðf 2 : d :*Þ are added to the database. We get
the same two arguments about PrðcÞ using QPRC:
D6 ‘QP ðc; ff 1; r1; r2g; "Þ
D6 ‘QP ðc; ff 2; r3; r2g; #Þ
As ever, they may then be ﬂattened to give the pair hc; li.
This ﬁnal example is again not entirely correct––if f 2 is asserted ﬁrst, a will
be d-separated from c and so the ﬁrst argument should never be constructed.
What is going on here is quite subtle, and points to issues at the heart of
qualitative probabilistic reasoning. The problem can be summarised by asking
what should the outcome be if f 1 and f 2 are asserted simultaneously.
This is a thorny problem because qualitative probabilistic reasoning as
captured in QPNs and QPR=QPRC is concerned with changes in probability
in response to evidence. As such the results of qualitative probabilistic infer-
ence make perfect sense when a single piece of evidence is presented. All the
changes calculated are those that result from that single piece of evidence.
Under this ‘‘single evidence assumption’’ algorithms for propagation in QPNs
and associated models [2,3,11], including QPR=QPRC, are sound (the kinds of
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ﬂawed reasoning we have been looking at here just cannot happen). All of these
problems arise when there are several pieces of evidence, and this matter is
further explored, in the context of qualitative probabilistic networks, in [16],
and future work will further investigate this problem.
6. Summary
This paper has identiﬁed a problem with the system of qualitative proba-
bilistic argumentation introduced in [10]. The paper precisely deﬁned the
problem and then proceeded to explore its eﬀects and then establish a solution.
The problem with the original system was the fact that it failed to take d-
separation into account in causal reasoning, a failing that is easy to correct by
ruling out arguments which do not respect d-separation (exactly the solution
provided here).
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